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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD C. HURST, 
Claimant-Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and TERRA 
DIAMOND INDUSTRIAL, INC., 
Respondents. 
Case No. 860058 
Category 6 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on appeal is whether or not the Peti-
tioner was properly denied unemployment benefits under 
§35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended (Pocket Sup-
plement, 1983), on the grounds that he had voluntarily left his 
work at Terra Diamond without good cause and that a denial of 
benefits would not violate principles of equity and good con-
science • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah pursuant to H35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, seeking 
judicial review of the unanimous decision of Mn» Board -..-f Re-
view, Industrial Commission of Utah, Case No. 85-BR-6h8, dated 
January 3, 1986, (see Appendix A ) , which affirmed the decision 
- 1 . 
of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ" hereinafter) in Case No. 
85-A-5189, dated June 14, 1985. (See Appendix B) The ALJ 
disqualified the Claimant/Petitioner ("Claimant" hereafter) from 
the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to 
§35-4-5(a) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, ("the 
Act" hereinafter), on the grounds that he had voluntarily left 
his employment at Terra Diamond without good cause and that a 
denial of benefits did not violate equity and good conscience. 
The ALJ's decision affirmed the decision of the Department 
representative which had also denied benefits pursuant to 
§35-4-5(a) of the Act. (See Appendix C) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts recited in the Claimant's Brief are correct, with 
the following additions. 
Within the first month of his employment at Terra Diamond, 
the Claimant understood that no commission base existed. Never-
theless, he elected to remain with the company because he con-
sidered the job to have a promising future. R. 70 
With respect to the housing subsidy provided by the employ-
er, such subsidy was to last for only 6 months. R.90 In addi-
tion to the 6 months of rent subsidy, the employer also paid the 
Claimant's rent for the first and last month, his cleaning 
deposit, and moving expenses. R. 73 
Throughout the period of the Claimant's employment, his 
commission income increased steadily and the Claimant believed 
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that within a few months his income would be sufficient to meet 
his expenses. R. 6 7, 90 
Now that the Claimant and his family have returned to Utah, 
the Claimant's wife may seek work to help meet the family's 
expenses. The Claimant had no work arranged at the time he 
moved back to Utah, nor any prospects of work. He is willing to 
accept employment paying $6 to $7 per hour. His current living 
expenses include rental payments of $450 per month. R. 89 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In reviewing the Board's decision, the Court will decide 
issues of general law without deference to the Board's deter-
minations, while affirming the Boards' determinations of basic 
fact if supported by evidence of any substance. With respect to 
issues of ultimate fact, mixed fact and law, and interpretations 
of the operative provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act 
which the Board is empowered to enforce, the Court will affirm 
the Board's determination if within the limits of reasonableness 
and rationali ty. 
§35-4-5(a) of the Act permits payment of unemployment 
benefits if the applicant has voluntarily left work with good 
cause. "Good cause" is such cause as would similarly affect 
persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity, and is so compel-
ling as to justify a prudent person in taking the same action. 
Good cause not established if the applicant could have continued 
to work while seeking other employment. 
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The Act also permits payment of benefits if a denial would 
violate principles of equity and good conscience. To meet this 
standard, the applicant must show that he acted reasonably, that 
the denial of benefits would be inconsistent with the purposes 
of the unemployment insurance program, and that the applicant 
has a continuing attachment to the labor force. 
In the present case, the evidence supports the independent 
determinations of the Department Representative, the ALJ, and 
the Board of Review that the Claimant did not have good cause 
within the meaning of the Act for leaving his work with Terra 
Diamond. The Claimant has also failed to establish that his 
actions were "reasonable" so as to justify payment of benefits 
under the standard of equity and good conscience. Therefore, 
the Board correctly disqualified the Claimant from eligibility 
for benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN REVIEWING A DETERMINATION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW, 
THE COURT WILL APPLY DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF REVIEW TO 
QUESTIONS OF FACT, QUESTIONS OF BASIC LAW, AND 
QUESTIONS OF MIXED FACT AND LAW OR INTERPRETATION OF 
OPERATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS. 
A. REVIEW UPON QUESTIONS OF FACT. 
Section 35-4-10(i) of the Act provides in part: 
In any judicial proceeding under this section the 
findings of the Commission and the Board of 
Review as to the facts if supported by evidence 
shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said 
Court shall be confined to questions of law. 
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The Court affords the greatest degree of deference to the 
Commission's findings on questions of basic fact, Utah Depart-
ment of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 
Utah, 658 P.2d 601 (1983). The Quantum of evidence required 
upon questions of fact before the Industrial Commission in 
unemployment compensation matters is ". . . evidence of any 
substance whatever which can reasonably be regarded as support-
ing the determination made . . .". Kennecott Copper Corporation 
Employees v. Department of Employment Security of Industrial 
Commission, 13 U.2d 262, 372 P.2d 987 (1962), reaffirmed in 
Taylor v. Department of Employment Security, Industrial Commis-
sion, Utah, 647 P.2d 1 (1982). Therefore, a finding of basic 
fact which is supported by evidence of any substance whatever 
must be affirmed, unless the finding is so without foundation as 
to be deemed arbitrary and capricious. 
B. REVIEW UPON QUESTIONS OF LAW. 
The Court applies a "correction of error" standard in 
reviewing the Commission's interpretations of general questions 
of law. Deference to the expertise of the Commission is not 
extended, given the Court's duty to correct misconstruction or 
misapplication of general law. Utah Department of Administra-
tive Services, supra at p. 13; McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah, 567 P.2d 153 (1977). 
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C. QUESTIONS OF ULTIMATE FACT, MIXED FACT AND LAW OR 
INTERPRETATION OF OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
A third standard of review seeks to assure that adminis-
trative adjudication falls within the limits of reasonableness 
and rationality. In applying this standard to agency decisions, 
the Court has invoked the "time honored rule of law . . . that 
the construction of statutes by governmental agencies charged 
with their administration should be given considerable weight . 
. .". McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra at p. 13. Specif-
ically in Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 
Department of Employment Security, Utah, 700 P. 2d 1129 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , 
the Court held that: 
. . . unless the administrative law judge"s decision 
based upon the proposed Rules and Regulations is 
outside the limits of reasonableness and rationality, 
we will uphold it. 
Thus the rule-making and interpretative authority of an agency 
falls within the scope of this intermediate level of review. 
The Court reviews the commission's interpretative rules with due 
regard for the Commission's authority to adopt such rules. 
Decisions by the Commission based upon interpretative and 
implementing rules will be reversed only if shown to be incon-
sistent with the governing legislation or the decisions of the Court. 
West Jordan v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 656 P.2d 
411 (1982); also see McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra at 
P. 14 and Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 p.2d 471 
(1944). 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Applying the foregoing standards of review to the present 
case, the Board's findings of basic fact are supported by 
substantial evidence, and should be affirmed. The Board's 
determinations as to issues of ultimate fact, mixed fact and 
law, and interpretation of the Act are well within the limits of 
reasonableness and rationality and should also be affirmed. 
Finally, as to issues of general law, the claimant has iden-
tified no instance where the Board has misconstrued or misap-
plied such law so as to require the Court's intervention. 
POINT II 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
CLAIMANT/PETITIONER DID NOT HAVE GOOD CAUSE WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF §35-4-5(a) OF THE ACT FOR VOLUNTARILY 
ENDING HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
§35-4-5 (a) of the Act requires that benefits be denied if 
the Claimant voluntarily left work without good cause, unless a 
denial of benefits violates principles of equity and good 
conscience. The elements necessary to establish good cause will 
be addressed in this portion of Respondent's Brief. 
Good cause for leaving work sufficient to justify payment 
of benefits is established if continuance of the employment 
would have had an adverse effect on the claimant which could not 
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be controlled or prevented, and necessitated immediate severance 
of the employment relationship. The separation must have been 
motivated by circumstances which made continuance of the employ-
ment a hardship or matter of real concern sufficiently adverse 
to a reasonable person to outweigh the benefits of remaining 
employed. Despite evidence of an adverse impact on the claim-
ant, good cause for leaving does not exist if the claimant could 
have continued working while seeking other work or followed 
alternatives that would have allowed him to preserve his job. 
See Denby v. Board of Review, 567 P.2d 626 ( U t a h ) , 1977, also, 
Rule A71-07-l:5(I)(B)(l) , Rules and Regulations of the Depart-
ment of Employment Security. The Claimant has the burden of 
proof and must show that he had good cause for quitting, or that 
he meets the requirements for allowance under the equity and 
good conscience provision before benefits can be allowed. Rule 
A71-07-1:5( I) (E) , Rules and Regulations of the Department of 
Empioyment Security. 
In applying the foregoing standards to determine whether 
the Claimant had good cause for leaving his work with Terra 
Diamond, it is noted the sole basis cited by the Claimant for 
his decision to leave was his short-term financial problems. R. 
89 The Claimant had no complaint with the work itself and the 
employer had fully performed all of its obligations under the 
Claimant's employment contract. R.78, 79 
While economic considerations may, under some circum-
stances, constitute good cause for leaving employment, it must 
still be shown that such considerations result in hardship 
- 8 -
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so as to provide the employer with an opportunity to alleviate 
those circumstances. As an outside salesman in southern 
California, the Claimant was located in one of the nation's 
largest job markets. He had sufficient freedom in his 
day-to-day activities to search for other work either in 
California or Utah. He has failed to establish that he made a 
concerted effort to find other work before leaving Terra Dia-
mond. R. 69 As already discussed, the Claimant did not take 
advantage of available alternative methods for easing his 
cash-flow problem. The Claimant also failed to unequivocally 
inform the employer that his situation was so serious as to 
compel him to quit. R. 75 The employer was willing to entertain 
suggestions by the Claimant to resolve the problem, and had 
acted in good faith before as shown by its willingness to 
subsidize the claimant's housing expense. In view of the 
foregoing, the ALJ and Board of Review properly concluded that 
the Claimant did not exhaust the alternatives which a prudent 
person would explore in a good faith effort to remain employed. 
In summary, the sole reason for the Claimant's decision to 
leave employment at Terra Diamond was his short-term financial 
condition. His salary, commissions and draws against future 
commissions provided him with sufficient means to meet his 
obligations. Even if such means had not been available, the 
Claimant could have continued to work while seeking other, more 
lucrative employment in the large southern California job 
market, or in Utah. Finally, the Claimant did not clearly 
advise the employer that assistance was necessary. In view of 
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for good cause but there were mitigating circum-
stances, and a denial of benefits would be unrea-
sonably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits may 
be allowed under the provisions of equity and good 
conscience if a! 1 of the following elements aVe 
present: 
a. the decision is made in cooperation with the 
employer by giving the employer an oppor-
tunity to provide information; 
b. the claimant acted reasonably; 
c. a denial would be inconsistent with the 
intent of the unemployment program; and 
d. the claimant demonstrated a continued 
attachment to the labor market. 
Rule A 7 1 - 0 7 - l : 5 ( I ) ( C ) ( l ) , Rules and Regulations 
of the Utah Department of Employment Security 
The Claimant has failed to establish that he acted reasonably, 
and for that reason the ALJ and Board of Review concluded that 
the denial of benefits in this case does not violate equity and 
good conscience. 
Department regulations define "reasonable 1 1 as: ...those 
actions which make the decision to quit logical, sensible or 
practical.... There must be mitigating circumstances which, 
although not compelling, may be considered as motivating a 
reasonable person to take similar action.1' Rule 
A71-07-l:5(I)(C)(2)(b) , Rules and Regulations of the Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
In this case, the Claimant chose to leave his employment 
because his income was allegedly insufficient to meet his living 
expenses; particularly his rent expense. However, by leaving 
work and returning to Utah, the Claimant deprived himself and 
his family of all income. R.88 While his move to Utah may have 
temporarily resulted in relief from rent expense, by the time of 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the ALJ, as affirmed by the Board of 
Review, is consistent with the requirement of the Utah Employ-
ment Security Act and the precedent decisions of this Court. 
§35-4-5(a) of the Act requires that benefits be denied to 
any individual who has voluntarily left work without good cause, 
unless a denial of benefits would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience. In this case, the Claimant has failed to establish 
of good cause for leaving his work. He has not shown reasons so 
compelling as would justify an ordinary, prudent person in 
taking such action, nor did he pursue alternatives which might 
have allowed him to remain employed. With respect to eligibil-
ity under the "equity and good conscience" provision of 
§35-4-5(a) of the Act, the Claimant's decision to leave work was 
neither logical, sensible nor practical--he did not improve his 
situation by leaving a promising job which was his only source 
of income. As his actions were not reasonable, a denial of 
benefits is not contrary to equity and good conscience. 
The Board's decision to deny benefits was based upon 
sufficient evidence adduced during a hearing at which the 
Claimant was afforded every opportunity to provide evidence 
which would justify his position. Sufficient evidence exists in 
the record to support the Board's decision, which is well within 
the limits of reasonableness and rationality. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of June, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
By 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Special Assistant Attornev Gpnprai 
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claim. In so holding, the Board of Review hereby adopts the findings of 
fact and conclusior i of law of the decision of the Adi ninistrative ! aw Judge. 
I h i s daci s l on w 111 become f i nal * - - ' v} h, .- * ter t< 
hereof and cny further appeal must be made directly n t n 
Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lale fit/, Utcn 
after this decision becomes final. To r , p 
Court you must submit to the Clerk 
Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, 
the Utah Employe nt Security Art, followed by 
Legal Brief. 
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he Utah * :•; -^.r 
within *tr -
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Driui to tiling a claim for unemployment insut ai ice bei ie f its against the State 
Df Utah el fective August 11, 1985, the claimant eai ned $1,200 per month plus 
commissions, a company vehicle, and an expense account as a sales t epresentative 
for Ten a Diei nond Industrial, Inc., w\ iere he was employed from May 1, 1934, 
t o A u g u s t 8, 1985, w I i e n ! i e q i J i t d t i e t o t ! i e c i i c i J n i s t a n c e s outlined b e 1 o w, 
The claimant was hii ed wf rile residif lg in Salt I ake City ai id was- assigned a terri-
tory in Southern Califcn i n'a. Prior to the time of hire relocation to Southern 
Call foi i i i a was disc us sed, a r »d t! ie claimant agreed to relocation i f f \eces sai y 
After working the Southern Califoi nia ter i itory for six months or so by commuting 
back and forth between Salt 1 ake City and Southern California, the decision 
to have the claimant move to Southern California was made, and in November the 
claimant and his spouse began looking for a suitable housing arrangen ient in 
that area 
The c 1 a i m a n t s u b s e q u e i 111 y I e a s e d a I i o m e i i i K i s s i o n V i e j o, Call f o) n i a , f o i $ 9 ? 5 
per month and moved in in mid-December, 1984, The employer paid the first and 
last months rent, cleaning deposit, ai id all ! noving expenses. Although it had 
not been disct issed prior to the decision to f lave the claimant permanently i elocate 
in Southern California, after realizing the housing costs wet e substantially 
higher there :*..r. - ^ : ••:V«'s> :ho employer agreed t o provide a I lousing allowance 
of i ' i J b for • ] , * months w:ih ihe thought that by the end of the six month period 
the <. I *. i n. i n t' s commissions w',u 1 d have i nM• ( a sed to 11 ie poi n t v;I ie r e I ie woi 11 d 
b e a>J*- • «i 
During « ,\L-
month ',*" 
-I b * f.p ndd i t ic r a 1 lu u* Jng i <> 
Howevei , no ,uusi ng u i i ci.v ice 
v i - d * - a 1 , i y c V 
m . : V d . fiy i h r 
w v - ^ - i ^ q -2- Harold C. Hurst 
85-A-blfc9 
clai; writ's ror.mi < sions , although they lluctuated greatly, were averaging approxi-
mately $7u0 per iriCMilh and were ino casing steadily. However, the claimant still 
felt unable to meet the financial obligations for himself and a family of a 
wife and six children without the continuation of the housing allowance. As 
a result, the claimant traveled to Salt Lake City in early July to meet with 
the company president and attempt to renegotiate a continuance of the housing 
subsidy. At first the company president indicated it perhaps v/ould be possible 
to continue the housing subsidy for another couple of months. However, on 
July 12, 1985, the claimant was notified the decision had been made not to 
continue the housing allowance. 
With that in mind, the claimant returned to California, reviewed his situation, 
and as he did not have enough money to meet the lease payment on his house for 
the month of July, he decided to quit and relocate back to Utah. A letter of 
resignation dated July 17, 1985, was typed and forwarded to the employer announ-
cing his intention to quit on or about August 15, 1985, and that he had to vacate 
the home he had leased in California by August 10. 
Contributing to the claimant's financial difficulties at the time of separation 
was the fact that his wife gave birth to their sixth child in early July. Con-
siderable confusion had existed ower the term of the claimant's employment with 
the employer in question concerning his health insurance coverage. Due to the 
cost of this benefit, the employer does not cover employees immediately upon 
hire but has a waiting period, which is negotiable to some degree, during which 
it is determined whether or not the individual in question is likely to be a 
long-term permanent employee. In the claimant's case, approximately four months 
subsequent to his date of hire he inquired about his insurance coverage. He 
was informed he could be added on the company's policy and approximately one 
month later, in early October, the office manager gave him some insurance papers 
to complete. This caused the claimant some concern, as he wondered why he was 
completing the forms a month or so after he had been told he had been added 
on, but he did not think much more about it and assumed both he and his family 
had health insurance coverage. In January, 1985, after relocating to California, 
the claimant's spouse was diagnosed as being pregnant, and in mid-February the 
claimant checked with the employer to make sure his wife's pregnancy was covered 
under the insurance plan. The office manager confirmed it v/as. However, in 
March, 1985, the claimant was informed that there may be a problem with the 
insurance coverage of the pregnancy as the conception date apparently preceded 
the date the claimant's insurance coverage was made effective, which was 
December 1, 1985. However, the office manager then received confirmation from 
the insurance company that the claimant was in fact covered. However, when 
the claimant's spouse's physician's office checked with the insurance company 
in April, 1985, to verify coverage they were told the claimant's spouse's 
pregnancy was not covered. This went back and forth for a number of days with 
the insurance company saying the pregnancy was covered one day and that it was 
not the next. The final disposition of the insurance matter at the time the 
claimant elected to quit was that the pregnancy was not covered on the basis 
that the conception date preceded the effective date of coverage and that he 
would be liable to pay approximately $4,000 in medical bills to cover the cost 
of a C-Section and the other costs associated with childbirth. However, in 
mid-September, 1985, over a month after the claimant's last day of employment 
with the firm in question, the clain.ant and employer were advised that the 
insurance company had in fact decided to cover the costs associated with his 
wife's pregnancy and subsequent childbirth. 
•9- 8?-l 344 - 3 - Mar o ld C. Hui bt 
<e i l c i u . n t began to i j a d i c i t e l y seek employment fo l l ow ing his t e l o i a t i o n to 
i l l tali? City in mid-August and has continued to look fo r employment on a i egular 
is is each i, i(k thiouyh the date of the hear ing. However, as of 1 he da1 e of 
iO h ic r iny he was s t i l l um mpl oyed. 11 le claimant i s i IOW w i l l i n g to accept 
n k at a pay I tve' i subst out ia My less than he was earning at Terra Diamond 
itlt the thought that his (pouse may have to f i n d work in order to maintain 
ie f i h o h i i a l i n t e g r i t y of t h e i r household. 
lASOIilNfi Ah!) I UNCI HS I0IJS ill I! AW 
e d i t i o n s that make a pos i t i on undesirable fo r an ind i v idua l are i lot i lecessar i ly 
j f f i c i e n t mot ivat ion to give the person good cause f o r q u i t t i n g the job w i th in 
ie meaning of- the Utah Employment Secur i ty Act , f f ie Act is concet ned w i t l i 
jch elements as wages or sa la r i es below the p reva i l i ng l e v e l ; the requirement 
la t the employee perform i l l e g a l a c t s ; working condi t ions which are i n ju r i ous 
3 heal th ; v i o l a t i ons of t l \e employment con t rac t ; excessive product ion requi re-
ments; a rid o t her c o n d i t i o n s o f a s i m i 1 a r i i a t u r e. 
i the present case, 1 ! ie d i f f i c u l t y of covet if ig t\ ie expenses of a lat ge f an l i l y 
n today's economy on the sa la ry of oi ie i nd iv idua l is ui idet stood. However, 
he record does not show there was any v i o l a t i o n of the employment conti act 
r that the c la imant 's compensation package was subs tar idard f o r the type of 
oi k he was performing. Although the inc ident if ivo lv ing the insurance coverage 
s regre t tab le , again t l »ere i s no evidence that tf ie ei i iployer was operat ing in 
ad f a i t h with respect t o ob ta in ing heal th insurance coverage f o r the claimant 
nd his fami ly. This is re in fo rced by the fac t the employer continued to nego-
ia te with the cat i ier oi i bef la' l f of tf te claimant af te r ' f i r s t becoming aware 
f the in-Jranee company's p o s i t i o n ar id by the fac t the c la imant 's expenses 
or Iv.s Rouse's pregnancy and subsequent c h i l d b i r t h -;•<•:: •, It imately pa id , a l b e i t 
eyond his date of separat ion from the employer «. . M^n. foe • . ' i c i .a r . ' ls 
ommissiens were increasing on a let ju l ,^ i v s i s , -.nd t ;. appears that i f that 
rend fad continued his f i r lancicil p i i M i . / t S ' • ; l'-;:->d . \~-: -bly 
i *' : r: (r\ months. 
n view of t! ie circumstances ou t l i ned above, i t is held the claimant has i tot 
stabl ished good cause fo r h is dec is ion to qu i t 1 i is employment w i th Terra Diamond 
n d u s t r i a l , I nc . , and tha t h is act ions in doing so were not s u f f i c i e n t l y ;i eason-
ble as to warrai i t a coi i c lus ion t hat a denial of i :nemployment i i tsurance 
ompensation would be cont? ary to equ i ty and good conscience. 
v i . r . ' i i L u ; n.j d 1 ; l o ; « r »ILiy i i ( M A I ^ . ^ O e I i y ' 11 ' x . , - e f rf h n r f i t r a t i o 
h..j»j'js .; . < t l ; . ' ' r»t wns separated f o r « iMumstances which would have resul ted 
n d \ " i i G i oi b l u n t s in ar«,ordance wi-h ihe provis ions of Section 35-4-5(a) 
1 t ' K-t " tuh r. 'ploy.. ; r i t l j ' i i r ; i y .'«• f ' n ^ f . u h
 u$ ho - i r i r .a j , . < oiit 
ase .^s w j o i a t e d ,\ ? d > qun ! 11 j i ng < i M umsi onces , i * is h j *i *v,t> employer 
S * : . . , ' : ' ' fe • n l . . . ; . n e * - ' " * ' E " ' n' " " ' 4 1 1 A im 
• : c i r , H ) W : 
1
 *• d i v . •', -if i fir ;s jio.-' « 1.1 M_ present csl i vo whnh denied unc. .ploymrnt insurance 
•c i .L i . i - •. n w t r ^ r i e ':: ; • provis ions of S u l l e n 1S - 4 r>(a) nf l i e Utah 
S?D-82-1344 
85-A-bl89 
Hcrold C. Hurst 
*J 
Employment Security Act is affirmed effective August 11, 19o5, end continuing 
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and 
earned wages for those services equal to at least six times his weekly benefit 
amount. 
The employer, Terra Diamond Industrial, Inc., is relieved of liability for charges 
in connection with this claim as provided by Section 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the 
Utah employment Security Act. 
Christopher W. Love 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision will become final unless within ten days from October 30, ]9^^LL 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review, P. 0. Box 11600, Salt 
lake City, Utah 84147, setting forth the grounds on which the appeal is made. 
jsn 
Attachment 
cc: Terra Diamond Industrial, Inc. 
c/o Vincent M. Tilby CPA 
7109 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Waine Riches, Attorney at Law 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
637 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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MOTIGRt THIS DBCI8I0H IS NADS OH IDUft CLAIM FOt RSHSFXTSi 
You voluntarily laft your job bacauaa you were diaaatiaflad with 
working conditional 
You have not shown that continuing your employment would hava 
cauaad aufficlant hardahlp to hava aada it nacaaaary for you 
to quit bafora finding another job or that you had no raaaonabla 
altarnativa to quitting* 
This danial ia not agalnat aquity and good conaclanca bacauaa 
you hava not ahown that your actions wara aufficiantly raaaonabla 
and you did not danonstrata a continuing attachment to tha labor 
market* 
Sanafita ara daniad under Sactlon 35-4-5(a) of tha Utah Rnployaent 
Sacurity Act bag Inning Auguat 11
 f 1985 and anding whan you hava 
aarnad wagas in bona fide covered employment aqual to at laaat 
els tiaas your waakly b^ >af it amount and you ara otharwiaa eligible* 
You aust provide proof of thaaa earnings whan you raport to Job 
8arvica to reopen your claim* 
RIGHT TO AS—INTERVIEW—if this decision waa baaed upon written 
in format ion only; you hava the right to an in-pereon interview* 
For an interview, you aust raport in peraon to tha neareet Job 
Service office within ten (10) daya of the data thia deciaion 
waa mailed* 
RIGHT TO APPEAL—If you believe thia deciaion ia incorrect aa 
to facta or conclusions, you hava tan (10) daya from tha data 
mailed to file a written appeal* Mail thia to the nearest Job 
8ervice office or tot Appeala Section; P.O* Box 11600; Salt Laka 
City, Utah 84147. Please include your Social Security number* 
Data Mailed 08*28-85 Rapr* D. Jacoba/cj Rap* • 2133 L.O. 81 
iiBIT < 
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MKKtwuiA v irage i; 
STATUTES AND RULES APPLICABLE TO THE CASE 
§35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides 
follows: 
5. An individual is ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work 
voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the 
commission, and for each week thereafter until the 
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered 
employment and earned wages for those services equal 
to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit 
amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibility 
for benefits if the claimant leaves work under circum-
stances of such a nature that it would be contrary to 
equity and good conscience to impose a disqualifica-
tion. 
The commission shall, in cooperation with the employ-
er, consider for the purposes of this act the reason-
ableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent to 
which the actions evidence a genuine continuing 
attachment to the labor market in reaching a deter-
mination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is 
contrary to equity and good conscience. 
Rules A71-07-l:5(I)A., B., C , E., and G., Department of 
ployment Security Rules and Regulations, provide as follows: 
A. GENERAL DEFINITION 
Voluntarily leaving work means that the employee 
severed the employment relationship as contracted to a 
separation initiated by the employer. This is true 
regardless of how compelling the claimant's reasons 
were for making the decision to leave the work. 
Voluntary leaving will include not only leaving 
existing work, but also the failure to return to work 
after a lay-off, suspension, or period of absence. 
Voluntary leaving also includes failure to renew a 
contract as in the case of a school teacher or ath-
lete. Benefits may be allowed following a voluntary 
separation from employment only if the claimant left 
work with good cause or a denial of benefits would be 
contrary to equity and good conscience. 
APPENDIX D (Page 2) 
B. GOOD CAUSE 
1. Good cause is established if continuance of the 
employment would have had an adverse effect on the 
claimant which could not be controlled or prevented 
and necessitated immediate severance of the employment 
relationship, or if the work was illegal, or unsuit-
able new work. 
a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant. The separation 
must have been motivated by circumstances which made 
continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of 
real concern sufficiently adverse to a reasonable 
person to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. 
There must be a showing of actual or potential phys-
ical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm 
caused or aggravated by continuance in the employment. 
The claimant's reason(s) for belief of the conse-
quences of remaining on the job must be real, not 
imaginary; substantial, not trifling. These circum-
stances must be applied as to the average individual, 
not the supersensitive. 
b. Ability to Control or Prevent. Even though there 
is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant good 
cause is not established if the claimant: 
(1) reasonably could have continued working while 
looking for other employment, or 
(2) had reasonable alternatives that would have made 
it possible for him to preserve his job through 
approved leave, transfer, or adjustment to personal 
circumstances, etc. or, 
(3) had not given the employer notice of the circum-
stances causing the hardship so the employer would 
have an opportunity to make adjustments which would 
alleviate the need to quit. 
C. EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE 
1. When the circumstances of the quit were not 
sufficiently compelling to justify an allowance of 
benefits for good cause, but there were mitigating 
circumstances, and a denial of benefits would be 
unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits 
may be allowed under the provisions of equity and good 
conscience if al 1 of the following elements are 
present: 
a. the decision is made in cooperation with the 
employer by giving the employer an opportunity to 
provide information; 
APPENDIX D (Page 3) 
b. the claimant acted reasonably; 
c. a denial would be inconsistent with the intent of 
the unemployment insurance program; and 
d. the claimant demonstrated a continued attachment 
to the labor market. 
2. The elements of equity and good conscience are 
defined as follows: 
a. In Cooperation With the Employer. In administer-
ing the unemployment insurance program, the intent of 
the Department is to maintain a careful balance 
between claimants and employers to make fairness the 
uppermost consideration. The employer is given an 
opportunity to provide information when the Department 
notified him that a former employees has filed a claim 
for benefits. Such notice provides an opportunity to 
explain the reason for separation. The employer is 
also notified of any appeal with regard to the sepa-
ration except as provided under Section 35-4-4(e). 
b. The Claimant Acted Reasonably. Reasonable is 
define?! a"s those actions which are consistent with 
traditional American work practices. The actions 
which might be acceptable for a member of a subculture 
are not the norm by which reasonableness is estab-
lished. There must be mitigating circumstances which 
make the decision to quit logical, sensible and 
practical. 
c. Consistent with the Purposes of the Act. The 
intent of the Act is to temper the hardships associ-
ated with unemployment and to provide stability for 
the economy by maintaining purchasing power. Even 
though there is some fault on the part of the claimant 
there are mitigating circumstances when the loss of 
employment is the result of the reasonable exercise of 
judgement. 
d. Continued Attachment to the Labor Market. The 
claimant establishes FTs attachment to the labor 
market by taking positive action(s) which could result 
in employment such as making contacts with prospective 
employers, preparing resumes, developing job leads, 
etc., during the first week after leaving work and 
continuing each week thereafter. Such a work search 
should have been undertaken without instructions from 
the Department. Failure to show attachment to the 
labor market during the first week of unemployment may 
be allowed if it was not practical for the individual 
to seek work in circumstances such as: illness, 
hospitalization, incarceration, or for other reasons 
beyond the control of the claimant. 
APPENDIX D (Page 4) 
E. EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OR PROOF 
Since the claimant is the moving part in a voluntary 
separation, he is the best source of information with 
regard to the reasons for the quit. The claimant must 
show by a preponderance of evidence that he had "good 
cause" for quitting, or that he meets the requirements 
for allowance under the equity and good conscience 
provision before benefits can be allowed. 
G. EXAMPLES OR SPECIFIC REASONS FOR SEPARATIONS 
In all the following examples, the basic elements of 
good cause or equity and good conscience must be 
considered in determination eligibility for benefits. 
The following examples do not include all reasons for 
leaving employment. 
3. Personal Circumstances. 
There may be personal circumstances which are suffi-
ciently compelling or create sufficient hardship to 
justify leaving work, provided the individual made 
reasonable attempts to make adjustments or find 
alternati ves. 
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Attorney During the time you were in California. 
Claimant Up until the final commission check, yes. 
Attorney And with your housing allowance that equals $1,731 available. Is that correc 
that we read your writing here. 
Claimant Yes, right. 
Attorney So there was a difference at that time of $234. Is that correct? 
Claimant Yes, I had to subsidize my living, or supplement it by $234 per month. 
Attorney Okay, and how long were you in California? 
Claimant Eight months. 
Attorney Eight months, and how did you continue to, how did you receive your commission 
Was it on a monthly basis, or quarterly basis or? 
Claimant It was quarterly. 
Attorney It was quarterly. So prior to receiving a commission check, then you woul 
have also had to expended out of your own money the $600 and some-odd dollars. 
Claimant Yes, we continued to supplement my income roughly $230 per month, actuall 
that is a little bit of a low figure considering my cost in moving down. Th 
incidentals. 
Attorney Then let's get right to the very last month that you were at work. Did you 
cost of living remain the same for that month? 
Claimant Yes. 
Attorney Were there any, well, were there any additional costs for that month? 
Claimant Yes, right at the last month there was a rent increase of $50 per month an 
the cost of the baby which was $4,000. 
Attorney Okay. Now, you have a document that you have prepared entitled cost of livin 
last month of work verses income and you indicate those figures that yo 
just testified to. What was your earnings during that last month, or you 
projected earnings for that last month? 
Claimant With the corr.T.i ssion check I just received and salary, less the housin 
allowance, it was $2,842. 
Attorney So you had at that time comparing the two a total debt for living expenses 
Well, a total living expense of actually $2,015, right? 
-10-
nt approval. And I asked him to let me know as soon as possible and explained 
again my situation. And on 7-12-85, that Friday, I went back to the office 
to try and talk with Pat again. I found out he was gone. And the secretary 
there, the office manager had my salary check again and no housing allowance 
check, and I asked her. Do you happen to know what Pat O'Day's final decision 
was on the housing allowance. And she said, yes, I do. They decided not 
to continue it again. And so I accepted that as their final decision. 
iey Okay. While talking with your employer, did you discuss any other alternatives 
that could be worked out either to make up for the housing allowance or to 
tide you over until say the commissions picked up to where they were above 
the place they currently were. 
int At that particular time we didn't really talk about any alternatives as he 
never brought up any alternatives and I didn't either because, I mean, there 
just wasn't. My savings were completely gone and there was just really nothing 
else I could do unless I had some help to continue on for a few months. And 
I just assumed that they would see it that way also because commissions were 
on the increase and another four to six months I probably would have been 
able to handle it. Ah, but then after I returned to California, a couple 
of weeks after I had returned to California. Well, after I had returned 
to California, a few days afterwards, I had made my final decision that, 
well, there is just nothing we can do. We simply can't afford to stay here 
as my rent was already a week and a half overdue. I had no choice but to 
inform my landlady that I didn't have the money to make up the difference 
and that we would have to move on the 8th of the following month, or the 
10th of the following month when rent was due. And so I had a letter typed 
up and sent it to Pat O'Day informing him that I had decided to quit. £nd 
then it was after I sent that letter to Pat O'Day, I talked with him on the 
phone. He expressed his regret that I had made that decision and left it 
at that and said that he probably would be down in another week or so to 
talk with me and to get our accounts up to date, information and so-forth, 
and to pick up the car, the company car. And so when he did come down, our 
discussion was what little we had talked about the job itself and my continuing 
was as stated in the letter. He made the statement that he had expected 
me to be a little more creative as a salesman. And to have worked with him 
on it and to come back with some counter proposals, and when I asked him 
like what options do I have for instance. He said, well, it might have been 
possible to for the company to have lent you the money for another six months 
and then had you repay it against commissions. And then after that he also 
made a statement, or made a comment that I might have even gone to the church 
to get assistance, you know, to fill the gap until my commissions could make 
up the difference. Of course, I didn't consider that an option at all. 
ley Well, of the options you discussed on that day, what were your feelings as 
to them. Why or why not didn't you take them? 
^nt Well, at that point I felt like, I mean I knew that they were well aware 
of my situation. That was obvious. I had talked to them on three separate 
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Claimant Ah, yes I did look around in the paper and made a few phone calls to potentia 
commission sales jobs and things of that nature. 1 didn't really pursu 
labor jobs as there was nothing in the area that would have paid what I neede 
to live in that environment. 
Attorney And what was the result of your inquiries into the sales type jobs? 
Claimant Ah, I had determined that with the two weeks I had left before I had to mak 
house payments again that I couldn't have come up with the money. In fact 
I was already two weeks into our last month's rent. And there was just n 
way that I could have accepted another job on commissions or anything tha 
would have taken a month or two to catch up. 
Attorney Okay. After your employer went to California and discussed with you abou 
say perhaps a loan or whatever that discussion was you described earlier 
did you have any other contacts regarding possible alternatives to quitting 
discussions with your employer. 
Claimant Ah, yes, I talked with him. When he was down there picking up the car fo 
those three days. He was there one day but I was talking him, or I did as 
him if he felt it might possible if I were to move back to Salt Lake an 
continue working the territory from Salt Lake. And he said, absolutely nc 
at this point. 
Attorney Okay. What happened after you quit as far as did you remain in Californi 
or did you relocate? 
Claimant After I sent the, 
Attorney Resignation letter. 
Claimant letter in I had to plan immediately to move as I only had another week ar 
a half or two weeks left. 
Attorney Okay, and where did you move to? 
Claimant We moved back to Salt Lake. I moved in with my sister up in the Cottonwoc 
area or Holladay area. We lived there for several weeks until we could fir 
a home to live in. 
Attorney And since that time have you done any job searching at all? 
Claimant Yes. 
Attorney Okay, and what has been the nature. How many attempts have you made £c 
on a weekly basis to find employment. 
Claimant Probably five or six. 
Attorney Five or six. 
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t At least. I have got recorded at least two of them as icquired in the 
employment booklet. 
) And what did these job searches consist of? Are they phone, are they in 
person? 
t Ah, two to three of them per week have been in person, interviews and turning 
in applications and probably, like I say, three, four, five others per week 
are over the phone just filtering out various jobs. 
y Applications. Do you have a resume? 
t I don't have a professional resume as such, no. 
y Okay, do you send out any information for the employer in terms of a resume? 
t In person, I fill out an application and attach a job history. 
y Okay. Had you known at what, when you were first hired. Let's go back all 
the way to May 1, 1984, did you know that you would have to relocate? 
it Ah, the understanding was that, yes, it would be best to relocate but that 
that was still an option to be discussed at a future time. 
y Okay. Had you known at that time that you would have to expend, what is 
it, between $5,000 and $6,000 of your personal savings, would you have accepted 
that job? 
it No. Within the first month after finding out that the territory I was taking 
over didn't have any commission base built whatsoever, it was maybe $50 per 
month, Ah, that was left over from what a couple of other salesmen had done 
down there. After knowing that, I could see that I might have made a mistake, 
but I decided at that point to hang in and try because it looked like it 
had some real promise. 
?y Okay. I have no further questions at this time. 
Ms. 0'Day, do you have questions? 
>r Urn, yes, am I? 
It is your turn to ask questions. 
ir Do I direct them to Mr. Hurst then? 
Correct. 
>r Okay, I understand you to say that you were aware that you needed to relocate 
or that that was a condition of the job at the time you were hired.. 
)t Ah, yes, it was, ah. 
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Judge Which meant prior to 11-1-84, right? 
Employer Correct. All right, Harold turned in and was reimbursed for all the busines 
expenses that he incurred for the period of time that he was employed wit 
us. And he didn't receive a housing subsidy for the month of July becaus 
we had paid the agreed on six months terms, and we had not renegotiated o 
negotiated any kind of an extension at that time. I was not aware that h 
regarded it as a negotiable item, the six-month subsidy. As far as th 
business was concerned was a six-month subsidy to help him get established 
It is not to say that we wouldn't have renegotiated it. We have always bee 
extremely flexible and always open to other options. When Harold was i 
the office July 9, 11, and 12, I did not have any personal contact with Hard 
because I was, I had ruptured a disc early in July and was doing busines 
by phone at home. I in fact did talk to Harold I think on the 5th or 6t 
of July and was notified that he had a baby. He did call me to tell me that 
but I didn't have any personal contact with him subsequent to that, eve 
though I was in touch with the office on a daily basis by phone. And th 
office in fact called me and we conducted business fairly normally at tha 
point. It was my understanding that Harold on the 11th was told by Pat tha 
it was economically unfeasible for the company to continue to subsidize hi 
housing since his sales weren't covering the cost of his salary and busines 
expenses at this time. They discussed the sales volume that he needed t 
achieve to put both of us in a profitable situation. And as far as rr 
understanding was that it was left open at that time. Ah, the Friday h 
came into the office, he came in after Pat had left for the day, so ther 
was no personal contact then. As far as I know, at no time did Harold attenp 
to contact me about any of these matters or to get, well, to negotiate ar 
of this personally with me. I did indicate to Harold after, when he stoppe 
into the office after we had picked up the company car and all of hi 
inventory, that we were sorry that he hadn't been creative enough to con 
up with some options other than quitting. That since he was hired as 
salesman, we thought it was appropriate that he would have been creativ 
and actually sold us on the fact that he was doing a good job and that thine 
were improving and that the possibility of a loan against commissions wa 
there, and that there had to have been other options. We specifically inquire 
as to whether or not he had thought about working in Southern Californi 
or getting another job down there, and he indicated that he just COUIGV 
afford to live dov^n there. Harold's reference to being squeezed out or choke 
out of the job in fact is baseless. We obviously are in a* worse positic 
now than we were in before in that we have spent, we have gone to considerabl 
time and expense in developing a territory and getting a customer bas 
established and people who know Harold, and now we are having to deal wit 
the fact that we don't have a salesman down in the Southern California area 
So obviously it wasn't advantageous to us to have him quit at this point 
So there was no reason for him to believe he was being squeezed out or choke 
out. We are still involved in developing that territory and we would ha\ 
liked to have had him stay on. I wasn't aware that he had incurred e 
increased amount in the lease paynent. It was my understanding that t\ 
lease was a one-year lease and that the payment was a flat payment for the 
one-year period. I haven't been able to verify that increased amount wi*1 
the lessor. She hasn't been in touch with me except to indicate that Harold 
?r had been mistakenly sent the security check. Ah, the salary, commissions, 
benefits, reimbursed expenses, territory and working conditions were all 
discussed with Harold in detail. I am sorry that his wife's pregnancy and 
the addition of a sixth child are financially taxing on him, but they are 
things that I don't have any control over. The termination of the housing 
subsidy was known and agreed on at the time it was instituted. We gave him 
as much or more than we have ever given anyone else in terms of extra effort 
and consideration for personal circumstances. He quit, it is my understanding 
that he quit because he wasnft making enough in commission to cover his 
expenses. But he understood what the salary and commission schedule was 
before he moved and he had the opportunity. He had six months prior to moving 
down there to assess the potential market before he relocated. And then 
he had an additional six months in California to renegotiate his working 
and living arrangements with us if he felt they were unsatisfactory. And 
the fact that he did not come in until he was in such dire straits is truly 
regrettable. But after he had made the decision to quit, we felt that it 
was a decision that he had made. He obviously doubted our integrity and 
that there was nothing to be gained by keeping him on. 
Okay, anything else? 
er No. 
Okay, Mr. Riches, questions? 
ey Okay. Ms. O'Day, did you actually interview Harold? 
er I did. 
ey You were the person who did. 
er Yes. 
ey Okay. 
er He also talked with Kim Hagerman on numerous occasions, the office manager 
who conducted her own sort of interview in the front office, and he also 
talked to Pat O'Day. 
ey Okay. Now you say that there was an individual in, was it 1982 or 3? 
er 1982, both. 
ey 1982, to worked at larger area including California and some other states. 
er Correct. 
ey Ah, do you recall what the commission base was at that time? 
er I think he was making about $700 a month. 
O/l 
Employer Vere you aware that there would be incidental expenses in relocating? 
Claimant Yes. 
Employer Would, did these seem excessive to you? 
Claimant No. The company was good enough to pay for the other stuff and I just wasn 
worried about it. 
Employer Okay. In December, 1984, you moved to California. Who, I understand y< 
entered a lease agreement at that time, is that correct? 
Claimant December 15, yes. December 10 we entered the agreement. 
Employer Okay. And that agreement the lease payment was $925 a month. 
Claimant Yes. 
Employer What were you required to do in order to enter into that lease. Was the 
a requirement for the first months rent or first and last months rent? 
Claimant First and last months rent and $300 deposit. 
Employer Okay, and who paid for that first and last months rent and the $300 deposit? 
Claimant The company did. 
Employer In full? 
Claimant Yes. 
Employer You, in fact, made no contribution in December towards your housing allowance 
Claimant No. 
Employer Okay, how about the month of July. Who paid your housing in that month? D 
you make any contribution towards your housing allowance in that month? 
Claimant Ah, during the month of July the house payment was on the last months rent. 
Employer And who made that last payment then, in fact. 
Claimant It was part of the first and last that the company paid. 
Employer Okay, and there was this $300 deposit. Was that returned to the compa 
or to you? 
Claimant No. It wasn't. I kept that at the time. 
Employer So it was mailed to you and you cashed the check. 
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Okay. Off record momentarily in the matter of Harold Hurst while I switched 
the tape. Nothing was discussed while off record. I think that response 
was properly recorded, so do you want to go on to your next questions, Ms. 
O'Day? 
er Okay. It is my understanding there was no discussion about alternatives 
during the two meetings that you had with Pat on the 9th and the 11th. Is 
that correct? 
nt Ah, yes. We did talk about alternatives. 
er You did. 
nt Yes. There was only one that the allowance continue. 
er And that was suggested by you. 
nt Yes. 
er Okay. You made no other alternative suggestions at that time? 
nt No. I wasn't as creative as Pat was. 
er Okay. Whose suggestion was it the commissions could be used, or that a loan 
could be extended against future commissions to help you through? 
nt That was a direct statement by Pat while he was in California. 
Br Okay. Did you, did you ever make the company, either myself or Pat or anyone 
else in the company aware of the subsidy that you were expending each month 
in terms of personal living expenses? 
it Many times. I had spoke with Pat when we were together that I hoped 
commissions would eventually catch up, referring to another month or two 
down the road, because I was having to supplement my income with my own 
savings. I don't recall the exact number, but it was at least three or four 
times. 
>r (Unaudible) 
Okay, I have, we need to take about a five minute recess at this point so 
I can make a phone call concerning a hearing that we are running into, so 
we will just take a brief recess and we will be back in a couple of minutes. 
We are back on record in the matter of Harold C. Hurst after a short recess. 
Why don't we proceed with your direct testimony, Ms. O'Day, on behalf of 
the company. 
>r My name is Judith O'Day and I am general manager for Terra Diamond in Salt 
L?ke, a corporation. It is a closely held corporation. My husband, Pat 
O'Day, is the president of the corporation and I work as general manager 
Employer Can I . . . 
Claimant $12,000 before that, $10,000, $8,000, $4,000, $5,000, $11,000, $15,000, $6,OCX 
$8,000. That is all the months. 
Attorney It sounds like they went up and down. 
Claimant They went up and down but were, you know, in cresendo, getting larger. 
Attorney What was your understanding after talking with Kim. Do you recall the questii 
you asked Kim at the time you called her concerning the insurance. 
Claimant Ah, yes, I do. 
Attorney Well, without referring to, do you recall it. 
Claimant It went back and forth so many times. Okay, the first time I inquired abo 
insurance was directly to Pat. Pat is the only person I ever really worV 
with at the company other than getting with Judy a few times for so 
information that she knew about. He is the president of the company. P 
said, yes, that you have insurance at three months. He, I might add, didn 
state that that he was sure. He said, I believe it is three months. Th 
is what he said. Then shortly after that I even checked with Kim and s 
said she wasn't sure but would check with Judy. And it was shortly aft 
that that my wife, because of a need--a small one, called up and was wonderi 
about it. And that was at about the 4th month. My wife is out here a 
will testify that Judy told her right then at the fourth month of work tha 
yes, or just before the fourth month. She said, yes, insurance is at fc 
months and I will see to it that you are insured. My wife is out here a 
will testify to that. And, so I didn't think about it anymore. I mea 
I just assumed that it would be taken care of. 
Attorney You made a specific inquiry, did you not, to Kim as to whether the insuran 
policy covers either a cesarean or your child or whatever at one time. 
Claimant I didn't refer to cesarean necessarily. That was brought up a little late 
but yes, I made an inquiry to Kim as to after I let them know that my wi 
was pregnant and that was in the middle of January. And she said she wasr 
sure. She asked me the due date and all that kind of stuff and said s 
would check it out. After she checked it out, roughly three weeks went 
and I wasn't worried about it. I just assumed we were because I thouc 
we were way before then and just. Well, anyway at about 2-15-85 Kim checi 
with Judy and told us that, yes, we were definitely covered. Then in 1 
third month of '85 Kim called and said there might be a problem, asked 
the dates again, and a week later she called and said that she had chec! 
with the insurance agent herself and that the insurance agent definite 
said we were covered. And so everyone at that point in time concurred t! 
we were covered. Then 3-21-85 is when Pat and Judy were in California. TI 
spent an evening with us and had dinner. When the delivery date and so-foi 
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it Well, in the middle of April, sometime in April when they finally found out 
that we definitely were not insured the only comment in talking with Pat 
that Pat made was, that is unfortunate that that happened. Because after 
everything had happened this Julie Beck at Planned Services who administrates 
their health policies said that, yes, she turned in the paperwork on October 8, 
and the conceived date was placed at October 16, and she said, yes, technically 
you should have been insured, but the paperwork wasn't actually turned in 
soon enough and we didn't get it on the books soon enough. 
By Okay, well, when did you go to the employer the first time and tell him about 
your problems, either with the insurance or . . . 
nt Well, they were aware of all this as it transpired, and it was in mid-April, 
like I said, that I actually made mention of it to Pat and he said that that 
is unfortunate that you are not covered. 
~y Okay, well, what about your economic problems? 
it Well, I put the baby on the back burner at that time and we decided that 
we would try and weather it because we felt like commissions would continue 
to increase well enough that in, you know, six months it probably wouldn't 
matter. That we would be able to handle it. 
sy And that is why you didn't. Well, why did you choose then to go in in July? 
it Ah, well, it was after July, or the end of June that I found out I didn't 
have any housing allowance coming anymore, that I decided to wait until I 
get to Salt Lake to talk with Pat. 
sy I don't believe I have any further questions. 
Where were you employed before you joined the Terra Diamond? 
it I had worked for several months with a brother-in-law paperhanging. And 
before that I had worked with Camelot Marketing. 
What kind of an operation is that? 
it Sales for East Canyon Resort. 
What kind of work are you seeking now? 
it Most anything I can get. 
What are you telling a prospective employer as to the minimum salary you 
are willing to accept? 
it Ah, I haven't really set a minimum, but the jobs I have been seeking ere 
on the order of $6 or $7 an hour. 
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Judge Okay, how would you be better off working $6 or $7 an hour in Salt Lake the 
the compensation package you had available to you in Southern California? 
Claimant Well, I assume that would be the minimum I would accept to get by up her* 
and that is if my wife went to work. But I am actively seeking jobs th< 
would pay on the order of $20,000 plus per year. 
Judge Have you had any employment subsequent to your separation from Terra Diamond? 
Claimant No. 
Judge Okay. You have indicated that upon relocation to Salt Lake you lived wi 
some relatives for awhile and now have secured apparently housing for yo 
family. Are you running a home again? 
Claimant Yes. 
Judge And what, how much are you having to pay to rent a home in Salt Lake nc 
It would appear to me that the $450 figure or whatever it was for 2,500 squa 
foot home in Holladay was low even for the Salt Lake area. 
Claimant It was a good deal. The average at that time was around $450 or $475 though. 
Judge So what are you having to pay for the home that you are now in? 
Claimant $450. 
Judge What part of the valley is that located in? 
Claimant It is about 70th South and 20th East. 
Judge And how large a home is that? 
Claimant About upstairs and down about 2,000 square feet with a garage. We happer 
into that. The owner is my wife's sister and her husband. They had JL 
moved into a new home. 
Judge Do you think you would still be with Terra Diamond if your wife hadn't, 
you hadn't had a sixth child? 
Claimant Ah, I think I probably would even though we would be getting further befr 
on some of our bills. Commissions were tending to catch up. But it ce 
to that point in time where commissions were still several hundred dollc 
a month short and after, when I got that final commission check from Tei 
Diamond and had to put money toward the baby, then what I normally voi 
have used to help us over the next three months was just basically gone afl 
coming to Salt Lake and putting front money up for doctors and all that k' 
of stuff. And so basically we had nothing to pay bills with after I w-
back to California. And in addition to that, the housing allowance was g< 
and so we were just in a tight spot. 
^appendix L, p. u j 
How long had you been without any health insurance coverage prior to the 
time that you were placed on the policy by Terra Diamond? 
it I had been without health insurance for about two years. Maybe close to 
two and one-half years. I, can I make a couple of comments here? 
Yes, sure. 
it On things that she said. Ah, in reference to when I started the job, Herb, 
the other person they hired was hired after I had applied at Terra Diamond. 
The ad was in the paper before they hired Herb or right at about the same 
time, and so my conversation as to existing commissions, you know, would 
still apply. I assumed that the commissions, there was some commissions 
built up in the territory. And after they had interviewed me they hired 
Herb. I don't know exactly what the decision making process, but anyway, 
Herb didn't get insurance for six months because they knew he didn't want 
it. Herb was a friend of the owner, Pat O'Day, and his wife was insured. 
She is a nurse, and so they didn't need it. In addition to that, there are 
employees down there, another employee that started just a month or two before 
me that did get insurance at four months. 
Who would that be? 
it Ah, it would be one of two employees in the shop, Cy or the other employee 
that is in the shop. I believe it is Cy. He was started a month or so or 
tv/o months before I did and had insurance at approximately four months. And 
once again, my wife is out here. She can testify that Judy told her just 
about three and two or three weeks that, yes, he does have, he will be insured 
at four months. We will take care of it. As far as my discussion with Pat 
on 7-11 when she claims that Pat said it was not feasible, that is not what 
Pat told me. He indicated that he probably would continue, but that he would 
check with Judy who made the decisions. That is after telling me on the 
9th that he probably would continue. 
Now you are making a reference to the housing allowance. Is that correct? 
it That was based on my suggestion, or my recommendation that, yes, I feel I 
can continue to get the commissions up there and that in a few months I would 
probably be all right. 
Well, upon relocation did you know that the housing allowance was not an 
indefinite allowance. That there was a date on or about six months when 
that was scheduled to . . . 
it When I moved down, there was nothing in writing. I was told that it was 
a six, that they would give me a housing allowance for six months and help 
with the move and so-forth because the cost of living down there is so darn 
much higher. And, 
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